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formation declines to zero. However, if the support of the cost distribu-
tion is not bounded away from zero, there is an equilibrium with some
information acquisition for arbitrarily large electorates. This equilib-
rium dominates in terms of welfare any equilibrium without information
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since proposed by Joseph Schumpeter [10] (very colorfully) and
Anthony Downs [1] (in more subdued terms), the “rational ignorance hy-
pothesis” has been part of the received wisdom in social sciences. In mod-
ern language, a weak version of the hypothesis proposed by Schumpeter
and Downs would be that, since either acquiring information or process-
ing publicly available information is costly for voters, and the impact of
any voter on the outcome of a large election is presumably negligible, indi-
vidual voters will generally chose to remain uninformed. A strong version
would extract the implication that the outcome of large elections will not
generally reﬂect the preferences of voters, insofar as discovering which of
the alternatives is best for each voter is costly. In this paper, we propose
a simple model of information acquisition in large elections that is consis-
tent with the weak version but disproves the strong version of the rational
ignorance hypothesis.
In the model, voters have heterogenous costs of acquiring information.
In large elections, only those voters with very small costs will be willing to
acquire information. The reason is that we focus on symmetric strategies,
and the probability of being decisive declines to zero for any sequence of
symmetric strategies. Thus, if the support of the distribution of information
costs is bounded away from zero, there will not be an equilibrium with in-
formation acquisition for large enough electorates. However, if the support
is not bounded away from zero, and any asymmetry in prior beliefs is mod-
erate, there will be an equilibrium for arbitrarily large electorates in which
a small fraction of voters decides to acquire information. Moreover, the ex-
pected utility of voters in this equilibrium will be larger than the expected
utility of voters in any equilibria without information acquisition. Intu-
itively, even though the fraction of informed voters declines to zero as the
electorate grows large, the probability that the informed voters are decisive
does not decline to zero. This implies that there is at least partially success-
ful information aggregation for arbitrarily large electorates. The condition
for fully successful information aggregation (that is, for choosing the best
alternative for voters with limit probability one) is very stringent, though:
fully successful information aggregation requires the density of the distri-
bution of individual costs to be unbounded at zero.
Though the model makes a number of simplifying assumptions–such as
common preferences and the focus on symmetric strategy proﬁles–we be-
lieve that the two most important implications of the model: (1) Only a
small fraction of voters are informed, and (2) Informed voters have a dis-
proportioned impact on the outcome of the election, are likely to hold in a
wide class of models of elections.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 2
The issue of information acquisition in elections have been recently the
object of some attention in the economic literature, though the literature has
focused generally on voting in committees rather than large elections. (See
e.g. the survey by Gerling et al. [5].) Mukhopadhaya [8] and Persico [9],
for instance, consider a setting in which committee members have identical
costs of acquiring information. With identical costs, there is a maximum
number of voters that can acquire information in equilibrium. Moreover,
there is no symmetric equilibrium with information acquisition for a large
enough electorate.
Information acquisition in large elections has been considered in Mar-
tinelli [7], a predecessor of this paper. In Martinelli [7], voters are identical,
as opposed to this paper, but can choose the quality of the information they
acquire, with the cost being a convex function of quality. (At least) partially
successful information aggregation in that setting is possible if the marginal
cost of information quality is zero when the quality is lowest. The model in
Martinelli [7] predicts that in equilibria with information acquisition, every
voter will be nearly uninformed, and the aggregate cost information acqui-
sition will decline to zero when information aggregation is more successful.
The model in this paper, per contra, predicts that there will be a minority
of voters with much better information than the rest, and that the aggregate
cost of information acquisition will grow unboundedly when information
aggregation is more successful. To the extent that the predictions of this
paper are more realistic, heterogeneity in the voters’ costs of acquiring and
processing information seems to be a necessary ingredient for satisfactory
models of information in elections.
Information acquisition in large elections has also been considered by
Feddersen and Sandroni [4], in the context of their ethical voter model [3].
The ethical voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni [4] predicts that a sig-
niﬁcant fraction of the electorate will acquire independent information and
that the fraction of informed voters may decrease with the quality of infor-
mation. More realistically perhaps, the pivotal voter model of this paper
predicts that only a vanishing fraction of the electorate acquire information,
and that the fraction of informed voters increases with the quality of infor-
mation, since a higher quality increases the individual incentive to acquire
information. We leave for the last section of this paper a few remarks on
the thorny (at least for pivotal voter models) issue of voter participation in
large elections.
2. THE MODEL
We analyze an election with two alternatives, A and B. There are 2n+1
voters (i=1,...,2n+1). A voter’s utility depends on the chosen alternativeRATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 3
d ∈ {A,B}, the state z ∈ {zA,zB}, and on whether the voter acquires infor-
mation or not. Acquiring information has an idiosyncratic utility cost given
by ci, so the utility of voter i can be written as U(d,z)−ci if the voter ac-
quires information and as U(d,z) if the voter does not acquire information.
At the beginning of time, nature selects the state. The prior probability of
state A is p ∈ [1/2,1); that is, if there is any asymmetry in prior beliefs, it
favors state zA. Voters are uncertain about the realization of the state. After
the realization of the state, nature selects the cost of information for each
voter. We assume that the cost of information is independently and identi-
cally distributed across voters according to a distribution function F. F is
strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over some interval (c,c)
such that 0 ≤ c < c, with F(c) = 0 and F(c) = 1. Each voter learns her own
cost of acquiring information but not the cost of information for other vot-
ers. After learning the cost of information, each voter must decide wether
to acquire information or not. Each voter then receives a signal s∈{sA,sB},
the “opinion” of voter i. If a voter acquires information, the probability of
receiving signal sA in state zA is equal to the probability of receiving signal
sB in state zB and is given by 1/2+q, where q∈(0,1/2). If a voter acquires
no information the probability of each signal is 1/2 regardless of the state.
Signals are private information.
The election takes place after voters receive their signals. A voter can
either vote for A or vote for B. (That is, there are no abstentions.) The
alternative with most votes is chosen.
We assume
U(A,zA)−U(B,zA) =U(B,zB)−U(A,zB) = r > 0.
That is, A is the “right” alternative in state zA and B is the “right” alternative
in state zB.
Afterdescribingtheenvironment, weturnnowtothedescriptionofstrate-
gies and the deﬁnition of equilibrium in the model. An action is as a triple
(x,vA,vB), where x ∈ {0,1} speciﬁes whether to voter acquires information
or not, vA ∈{A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving sig-
nal sA, and vB ∈{A,B} speciﬁes which alternative to vote for after receiving
signal sB. A strategy for voter i is a (measurable) mapping
si(ci) : (c,c) → {0,1}×{A,B}×{A,B},
specifying an action for every realization of the cost ci. (For simplicity, we
omit considering strategies that allow for randomizing over actions.) An
equilibrium s (si = s for all i) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. An equi-
libriumwithinformationacquisitionisanequilibriumsuchthatthedistribu-
tionoveractions(inducedbythedistributionofcostsandbytheequilibrium
mapping) assigns positive probability to the set of actions with x = 1.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 4
Obviously, there are at least two equilibria without information acquisi-
tion: for every voter to adopt the action (0,A,A) for every realization of the
cost of information, and for every voter to adopt the action (0,B,B) for ev-
ery realization of the cost of information. In either case, the probability that
a single voter is decisive is zero, so it is a best response to acquire no infor-
mation and vote for the alternative favored by every other voter. We focus
on equilibria with information acquisition in the remainder of the paper.
3. THE EQUILIBRIA WITH INFORMATION ACQUISITION
3.1. Cutoffs and wedges. Theorem 1 below shows that equilibria with in-
formation acquisition for arbitrarily large electorates must be characterized
by a cutoff cn such that voters acquire information (and vote according to
the information received) only if their idiosyncratic cost falls below the cut-
off, and by a “wedge” wn ≥ 0, such that uninformed voters vote for the
alternative favored by prior beliefs with probability 1/2+wn.
We have
Theorem 1. There is some n such that for n≥n a mapping sn is an equilib-
rium with information acquisition if and only if the probability distribution
over actions induced by sn and F satisﬁes
Pr[sn(ci) = (1,A,B)|ci < cn] = 1
and
Pr[sn(ci) = (0,A,A)|ci > cn]−Pr[sn(ci) = (0,B,B)|ci > cn] = 2wn,


















(1− p)qr = cn. (2)
To provide some intuition, note that, if p = 1/2, equations 1 and 2 admit








The term in brackets is equal to the probability of a voter being decisive in
either state, i.e. the probability that n other voters vote for A and n other
voters vote for B. The left-hand side is equal to the gain of acquiring infor-
mation; that is, the probability of being decisive multiplied by the precision
gain q and the utility gain r. Thus, if p = 1/2, (i) uninformed voters vote
for A or for B with the same probability and (ii) the marginal informed voter
equates the gain of acquiring information with the cost of information.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 5
If p>1/2, the equilibrium with information acquisition requires that un-
informed voters vote with larger probability for A than for B (i.e. the wedge
wn is positive) so that the probabilities of states zA and zB, conditional on
the voter being pivotal, are equal to each other, in order to keep uninformed
voters willing to randomize in the ﬁrst place. This implies that the probabil-
ity of being decisive, multiplied by the prior probability, is the same in both
states. The indifference condition for the marginal informed voter equates
the sum of the probabilities of being decisive in either state, weighted by
the prior probabilities, multiplied by the precision gain q and the utility
gain r, to the cost of information. This indifference condition can be writ-
ten substituting the probability of being decisive in state zA times the prior
probability of state zA times two for the sum of the weighted probabilities,
as in equation 1, or substituting the probability of being decisive in state zB
times the prior probability of state zB times two for the sum of the weighted
probabilities, as in equation 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. For any given symmetric mapping s, let ts(z) be the
probabilitywithwhicheachvotervotesforalternativeAinstatezasinduced







denote the probability that a single voter is decisive in state z as induced by







in particular, as n increases the probability of being decisive converges uni-
formly to zero for any sequence of symmetric strategy mappings.
Consider a symmetric strategy mapping with information acquisition s
and a voter who has acquired information and has received the signal sA.
For this voter, the posterior probability of state zA, conditional on being




It is easy to see that the voter will prefer to vote for A if
(1/2+q)Ps(piv|zA)p > (1/2−q)Ps(piv|zB)(1− p);
that is, the voter prefers to vote for A if the posterior probability of state zA,
conditional on being pivotal and on receiving signal sA, is larger than the
posterior probability of state zB.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 6
We claim that this inequality above necessarily holds if s is an equilib-
rium mapping. To see this suppose that
(1/2+q)Ps(piv|zA)p ≤ (1/2−q)Ps(piv|zB)(1− p).
Then adopting the action (0,B,B) with probability one (and saving the cost
of information acquisition) would yield more utility to any voter than the
strategy s, since the voter would strictly prefer to vote for B in case or
receiving signal sB and would be at best indifferent between A and B in case
of receiving signal sA. A similar argument shows that
(1/2+q)Ps(piv|zB)(1− p) > (1/2−q)Ps(piv|zA)p.
Therefore, in any equilibrium with information acquisition, voters who ac-
quire information vote for A if they receive the signal sA and for B if they
receive the signal sB.
It is easy to see that if a voter ﬁnds advantageous to acquire information
for any realization of the cost in a given interval, the voter will ﬁnd ad-
vantageous to acquire information for any realization of the cost in a lower
interval. Thus, if s is an equilibrium with information acquisition, there is
a cutoff cs such that for the voter will acquire information for almost ev-
ery realization of ci such that ci < cs, and will not acquire information for
almost every other realization of ci. Thus,
Pr[s(ci) = (1,A,B)|ci < cs] = 1.
Let vs be the probability with which uninformed voters vote for A; that
is
Pr[sn(ci) = (0,A,A)|ci > cs]+ 1
2 Pr[sn(ci) = (0,A,B)|ci > cs]
+ 1
2 Pr[sn(ci) = (0,B,A)|ci > cs] = vs.






























We can now calculate the gain of acquiring information as
(pPs(piv|zA)+(1− p)Ps(piv|zB))qr.
From the previous calculations it follows that an equilibrium with informa-







However, the left-hand side of this equation converges uniformly to zero,
so that an equilibrium in which voters acquire information with probability
one is impossible for large n. Thus, cs < c. Moreover, it must satisfy the
indifference condition
(pPs(piv|zA)+(1− p)Ps(piv|zB))qr = cs. (5)
We claim that if s is an equilibrium with information acquisition and
cs < c (so that voters are uninformed with positive probability) then
pPs(piv|zA) = (1− p)Ps(piv|zB); (6)
that is, uninformed voters are indifferent between voting for A and voting
for B. For if, say, pPs(piv|zA) > (1− p)Ps(piv|zB); then every uninformed
voter would have an incentive to vote for A. But then, taking into account
the behavior of informed voters, we obtain Ps(piv|zA) < Ps(piv|zB), a con-
tradiction.
Putting together equations 3, 4, 5 and 6 we obtain that equations 1 and
2 in the statement of the theorem are necessary and sufﬁcient for the sym-
metric strategy s (with cs = cn and ws = wn) to be an equilibrium with
information acquisition for large n. 
3.2. Existence. Theorem 2 below shows that there are equilibria with in-
formation acquisition for arbitrarily large electorates only if c = 0. Since
the left-hand side of equations 1 and 2 converge uniformly to zero for large
n, the cutoff cn must converge to zero along any sequence of equilibria with
information acquisition.
If c = 0, we deﬁne f(0) = limc↓0F0(c). If F0(c) grows unboundedly as
c approaches zero, we use the convention f(0) = ¥. Intuitively, f(0) plays
an important role with respect to information aggregation in large electionsRATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 8
because the cutoff cn converges to zero along any sequence of equilibria




Note that p = 1/2 if f(0) = 0 and p = 1 if f(0) = ¥, and moreover p
is strictly increasing in f(0) in between. If 1/2 ≤ p < p, the asymmetry
in prior beliefs is “moderate” which allows for the existence of equilibria
with information acquisition. Intuitively, if the asymmetry in prior beliefs is
not moderate, it becomes impossible to make uninformed votes indifferent
between the two alternatives while at the same time providing incentives to
some voters to acquire information.
We have
Theorem 2. (i) If c=0, f(0)>0 and p< p, there there is some n such that
for n ≥ n there is an equilibrium with information acquisition.
(ii) If either c > 0 or c = 0, f(0) > 0 and p > p, there is some n such that
for n ≥ n there is no equilibrium with information acquisition.
Proof. Lemma 2(i) and (ii) in the Appendix shows that if f(0) > 0 and
p < p, then the system given by equations 1 and 2 has a solution for n large
enough satisfying qF(cn)/(1−F(cn)) ≥ wn. An example of equilibrium





(1,A,B) if ci ≤ cn
(0,A,A) if cn < ci ≤ c∗
(0,B,B) if ci > c∗
,
where c∗ solves F(c∗) = F(cn)/2+1/2+wn, and (cn,wn) is a solution to
equations 1 and 2. (Note that qF(cn)/(1−F(cn))≥wn implies that wn must
converge to zero, so c∗ is well-deﬁned.) Part (i) of the theorem follows from
Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 (iii) in the Appendix shows that if c = 0, f(0) > 0 and p > p,
there is some n such that for n ≥ n there is no solution to equations 1 and 2.
Similarly, since the left-hand side of equations 1 and 2 converges uniformly
to zero as n goes to inﬁnity, it follows that there cannot be a solution to
equations 1 and 2n for n large enough if c > 0. Part (ii) of the theorem
follows from Theorem 1. 
Theorem 2 tells us whether there are or there are not equilibria with infor-
mation acquisition in every possible circumstance except if either (1) c = 0
and p = p or (2) c = 0, f(0) = 0 and p > p. The ﬁrst exception is unim-
portant to the extent that it is a knife-edge case in relation to prior beliefs.
With respect to the second exception, the analysis in the next section showsRATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 9
that if there are equilibria with information acquisition under those circum-
stances, in the limit they are payoff-equivalent to the equilibrium in which
nobody acquires information and voters vote for the alternative favored by
prior beliefs.
4. INFORMATION AGGREGATION
In this section and the remainder of the paper we assume c = 0. Let
Ps(A|zA) and Ps(B|zB) be, respectively, the probability of choosing alter-
native A in state zA and the probability of choosing alternative B in state zB
for a given strategy proﬁle s. In this section we investigate the limit of the
probabilities Psn(A|zA) and Psn(B|zB) as n grows large along a sequence of
equilibrium proﬁles with information acquisition.
If 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p < p, we deﬁne (k∗,h∗) ∈ [0,¥)2 to be the solution
to
kexp(4(k+h)2) = 2p−1/2q2rf(0)p, (7)
kexp(4(k−h)2) = 2p−1/2q2rf(0)(1− p) (8)
satisfying h ≤ k. Lemma 1(i) in the Appendix shows that such a solution
exists and is unique. As shown by Lemma 2(i), k∗ and h∗ represent respec-
tively the limit of the bias of voters toward the right alternative (qF(cn))
and the limit of the bias toward the alternative favored by prior beliefs




n is important because
of the central limit theorem.
Let F denote the standard normal distribution function. We have
Theorem 3. (i) If 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p < p, there is a sequence sn of equi-
libria with information acquisition such that along that sequence
Psn(A|zA) → F(2
√
2(k∗+h∗)) and Psn(B|zB) → F(2
√
2(k∗−h∗)).
(ii) If f(0) = ¥, then along any sequence sn of equilibria with information
acquisition
Psn(A|zA) → 1 and Psn(B|zB) → 1.
(iii) If f(0) = 0 and p > 1/2, then along any sequence sn of equilibria with
information acquisition
Psn(A|zA) → 1 and Psn(B|zB) → 0.
Theorem 3(i) states a result for a given sequence of equilibria and not for
allsequencesofequilibriawithinformationacquisition. Moregenerally, we
can say that along any sequence of equilibria with information acquisition
such that Psn(A|zA) and Psn(B|zB) converge,
Psn(A|zA) → F(2
√
2(k0+h0)) and Psn(B|zB) → F(2
√
2(k0−h0))RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 10
for some solution (k0,h0) to equations 7 and 8. We do not state the theo-
rem in terms of every sequence of equilibria with information acquisition
because, if p < p and 0 < f(0) < ¥, equations 7 and 8 admit a solution
such that k < h, i.e. an equilibrium in which there is more bias toward the
alternative favored by prior beliefs than toward the right alternative.
If p=1/2, equations 7 and 8 do admit a unique solution. We have h∗ =0
and k∗ given by
k∗exp(4k∗2) = p−1/2q2rf(0).
If f(0) > 0, we get k∗ > 0. Thus, if p = 1/2 and f(0) > 0, the limit prob-
ability of choosing the right alternative is strictly larger than 1/2 in either
state along any sequence of equilibria with information acquisition.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that the state is zA. Given the equilibrium
strategy described in Theorem 1, the event of a given voter voting for A in








1/2−(F(cn)q+(1−F(cn))wn) if voter i votes for A,
−1/2−(F(cn)q+(1−F(cn))wn) if voter i votes for B.
For each n, the random variablesVn
i are iid. Moreover,
E(Vn
i ) = 0,
E((Vn
i )2) = 1/4−(F(cn)q+(1−F(cn))wn)
2, and
E(|Vn
i |3) = 1/8−2(F(cn)q+(1−F(cn))wn)
4.
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Usinganapproximateversionofthecentrallimittheoremforﬁnitesamples,








The right-hand side of the equation above converges to zero as n goes to
inﬁnity, so we obtain an increasingly good approximation using the normal
distribution even though the distribution of Vn
i changes with n. Thus,
lim
n→¥|Fn(Jn)−F(Jn)| = 0.
Suppose now that 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p < p. From Lemma 2(i) in the
Appendix we have that there is a sequence of equilibria with information
acquisition such that along this sequence, as n increases,
qF(cn)n1/2 → k∗ and wnn1/2 → h∗.














2(k∗ +h∗)). (Similar calculations show that if the state is zB, the
probability of B winning the election converges to F(2
√
2(k∗−h∗)).)
Suppose that f(0) = ¥. From Lemma 2(ii), along any sequence of equi-
libria with information acquisition,
(qF(cn)+wn(1−F(cn)))n1/2 → ¥.
Then Jn goes to −¥. Thus, for arbitrarily large L, the probability of A win-
ning the election is larger than 1−Fn(−L) for n large enough. Using the
normal approximation above we can see that the probability of A winning
must go to one. (Similar calculations show that if the state is zB, the proba-
bility of B winning the election converges to 1.)
Suppose ﬁnally that f(0) = 0. From Lemma 2(iii), along any sequence
of equilibria with information acquisition,
(qF(cn)+wn(1−F(cn)))n1/2 → ¥.
Then Jn goes to −¥. Thus, for arbitrarily large L, the probability of A
winning the election is larger than 1−Fn(−L) for n large enough. Thus, the
probability of A winning must go to one. (Note that, from Lemma 2(iii),
along any sequence of equilibria with information acquisition,
(qF(cn)−wn(1−F(cn)))n1/2 → −¥.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 12
Similar calculations show that if the state is zB, the probability of B winning
the election converges to zero.) 
5. THE AGGREGATE COST OF INFORMATION






Theorem 4. As the number of voters increases, along the sequence of equi-
libria described by Theorem 3 the aggregate cost of information acquisition
converges to k∗2/(q2f(0)) if f(0) ∈ (0,¥), to zero if f(0) = 0, and it grows
unboundedly if f(0) = ¥.
Proof. Using the mean value theorem for H(cn) ≡
R cn
0 cF0(c)dc we have
that the expected aggregate cost of information is
(2n+1)xnF0(xn)cn







Suppose f(0) ∈ (0,¥). Then qF(cn)n1/2 → k∗. Thus, for some se-
quence xn0 between 0 and cn, qF0(xn0)cnn1/2 → k∗. It follows that cnn1/2 →
k∗/(qf(0)). But then we get that the expression 9 in the limit is equal to
2×(k∗/(qf(0)))2× f(0)×1,
or equivalently k∗2/(q2f(0)).
Suppose f(0)=0. Then qF(cn)n1/2 →0. It follows that cnn1/2 →0. But
then we get that the expression 9 in the limit is equal to zero.
Suppose f(0) = ¥. Then qF(cn)n1/2 → ¥. It follows that cnn1/2 → ¥.
But then we get that the expression 9 grows unboundedly with n. 
6. WELFARE
Since the cutoff cn declines to zero along any sequence of equilibria with
information acquisition, it follows that the average expected cost of infor-
mation acquisition declines to zero. Thus, if 0< f(0)<¥ and p< p, along
the sequence of equilibria described in Theorem 3(i), the expected utility of










2(k∗−h∗)))U(A,zB).RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 13
The expected utility of a voter under the best possible equilibrium without
information acquisition is
pU(A,zA)+(1− p)U(A,zB),
which corresponds to the symmetric strategy of voting for the alternative
favored by prior beliefs no matter what. We claim that the expected utility





2(k∗+h∗))) > p/(1− p).
To see this, from equations 7 and 8 we can get





where f is the standard normal distribution density. Using the symmetry















which is satisﬁed because the normal hazard rate is strictly decreasing.
If f(0) = ¥, the equilibrium with information acquisition is asymptoti-
cally efﬁcient, in the sense that the expected utility of a voter converges to
its maximum possible value,
pU(A,zA)+(1− p)U(B,zB),
corresponding to choosing the right alternative with probability one at no
(average) cost. If f(0) < ¥, however, the equilibrium with information ac-
quisition is not asymptotically efﬁcient. To see this, consider a sequence of
symmetric cutoff strategy proﬁles described for n large enough by ˆ wn = 0
and ˆ cn such that qF(ˆ cn)=n−0.4. Along this sequence of symmetric strategy
proﬁles, the expected utility of a voter converges to its maximum possible
value, which is strictly larger than the limit expected utility under any se-
quence of equilibria.
7. FINAL REMARKS
This paper provides a pivotal voter model with costly information that
predicts that only a small fraction of voters acquires information in large
elections–a prediction we ﬁnd entirely acceptable. A pivotal voter model
with costly participation in elections will typically predict that only a small
fraction of voters will turn out to vote–a prediction at odds with mass partic-
ipation in large elections seemingly everywhere. A way out of this predica-
ment may be a model that endogenously splits the electorate in leaders and
followers, along the lines of Herrera and Martinelli [6]. In that paper, the
number of leaders is determined by decisiveness considerations. ElectoralRATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 14
turnout, in turn, is determined by the number of leaders and the stochas-
tic attachment of followers to leaders. (The technology used by leaders
to mobilize followers to participate in the elections is left as a black-box.)
We believe that it is possible to introduce an information acquisition com-
ponent in a similar leader-follower model of elections, with leaders doing
essentially all the independent information acquisition in large elections,
and providing information to other voters.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 15
APPENDIX: AUXILIARY LEMMATA
Lemma 1. (i) If 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p ≤ p, the system 7 and 8 has a unique
solution satisfying k ≥ h. (ii) If 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p > p, the system 7 and
8 does not have a solution.
Proof. Let
h = 2p−1/2q2rf(0)(1− p).
Suppose ﬁrst that p ≤ p as in part (i) of the Lemma. Let kI(h) represent
the value of k that solves equation 7 for any given h ∈ [0,h]. Note that kI(h)
is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of h. Similarly, let kII(h)
represent the value of k that solves equation 8 satisfying k ≥h for any given
h ∈ [0,h]. Note that kII(h) is a continuous and strictly increasing function
of h and moreover kII(h) > h if h < h.
Since p≥1/2, we have that kI(0)≥kII(0). It is easy to calculate kII(h)=
h. We claim that kI(h) ≤ h. To see this, evaluating the left-hand side of
equation 7 at k = h = h we obtain
2p−1/2q2rf(0)(1− p)exp(64p−1q4r2f(0)2(1− p)2).





or equivalently, whenever p ≤ p. Thus kI(h) must be smaller or equal to h.
Using kI(0) ≥ kII(0) and kI(h) ≤ kII(h) we obtain that there is a unique
h∗ ∈[0,h] such that kI(h∗)=kII(h∗). Deﬁning k∗ =kII(h∗) we obtain that if
p ≤ p there is a unique solution k∗,h∗ to equations 7 and 8 satisfying k ≥ h.
Supposenowthat p> pasinpart(ii)oftheLemma. Anargumentsimilar
to the previous case proves that, if there is a solution k∗,h∗ to equations 7
and 8, it must satisfy h∗ > h. But then, using equation 8, we get k∗ < h.
Thus, if thereis a solution k∗,h∗ to equations 7and 8, it must satisfy h∗ >k∗.






















= 2p−1/2q2rf(0)(1− p). (10)
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Note that the left-hand side of equation 10 is strictly decreasing in k for any
give k satisfying the constraint above. Thus, equation 10 has a solution if











But this implies p < p, a contradiction. 
Lemma 2. (i) If c = 0, 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p < p, there is some n such
that for n ≥ n there is a solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2 satisfying
qF(cn)/(1−F(cn)) ≥ wn . Moreover, as n increases,
qF(cn)n1/2 → k∗ and wnn1/2 → h∗,
where (k∗,h∗) ∈ Â2
+ is the solution to equations 7 and 8 satisfying k ≥ h.
(ii) If c = 0 and f(0) = ¥, there is some n such that for n ≥ n there is a
solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2. Moreover, as n increases, along any
sequence of solutions (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2,
(qF(cn)−wn)n1/2 → ¥.
(iii) If c = 0, 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p > p, there is some n such that for n ≥ n
there is no solution to equations 1 and 2.
(iv) If c = 0, f(0) = 0 and p > p, then as n increases, along any sequence
of solutions (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2
qF(cn)n1/2 → 0 and wnn1/2 → ¥.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that c = 0, 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p < p as in part (i) of the
















cnn1/2 → 2p−1/2(1− p)qr.RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 17
Using the mean value theorem for F we have
qF(cn)n1/2 = cnn1/2F0(x)
for some x between zero and cn. Thus,
qF(cn)n1/2 → 2p−1/2(1− p)qrf(0)
and
wnn1/2 → 2p−1/2(1− p)qrf(0).
That is, qF(cn)n1/2 → h and wnn1/2 → h, where h is as deﬁned in the proof
of Lemma 1.









and for any w ∈ [0,wn], deﬁne cn
I(w) to be the value of cn that solves equa-
tion 1 for wn = w. Note that cn
I(w) is a continuous and strictly decreasing
function of w. Similarly, deﬁne cn
II(w) to be the value of cn that solves equa-
tion 2 for wn = w under the constraint qF(cn)/(1−F(cn)) ≥ wn. Note that
cn
II(w) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of w.
Since p ≥ 1/2, we have cn
I(0) ≥ cn
II(0). It is easy to calculate cn
II(wn) =
cn. We claim that for n large enough, cn
I(wn) < cn. Since the left-hand side
of equation 1 is decreasing in cn and the right-hand side is increasing in cn,
we only need to show that the left-hand side of equation 1 is smaller than
the left-hand side when evaluated at cn = cn and wn = wn. That is, after






< (1− p)/p. (11)
Since (qF(cn)+wn(1−F(cn)))n1/2 → 2h, the left-hand side of the in-
equality above converges to exp(−4(2h)2) (see e.g. Durrett [2], Theorem
4.2, p. 94). Thus, we need to show
exp(−16h
2) < (1− p)/p.





II(wn) for n large enough we get that
there exists a solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2 satisfying qF(cn)/(1−
F(cn)) ≥ wn for n large enough, and it is indeed the unique solution sat-
isfying that constraint. Next, we claim that under the sequence of such
solutions, as n increases,
qF(cn)n1/2 → k∗ and wnn1/2 → h∗,RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 18
where (k∗,h∗) is the unique solution to equations 7 and 8 satisfying k ≥ h.
To see this, let kn = qF(cn)n1/2 and hn = wnn1/2. We can rewrite equations













(1− p)qr = n1/2F−1(knq−1n−1/2).
Using the mean value theorem for F−1 we have
n1/2F−1(knq−1n−1/2) = kn(F−1)0(xn)/q







































(see e.g. Durrett [2], Theorem 4.2, p. 94). It is easy to check that if 0 <
f(0) < ¥, kn and hn cannot grow arbitrarily large along any subsequence
of solutions (kn,hn) to equations 12 and 13. Thus, along any converging
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or equivalently, equations 7 and 8. It follows that kn → k∗ and hn → h∗.
Now suppose c =0 and f(0)=¥ as in part (ii) of the Lemma. Deﬁne cn,
wn, cn
I(w) and cn
II(w) as in the proof of part (i). Note that now
qF(cn)n1/2 → ¥.




II(wn) for n large
enough, so there exists a solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2 satisfying
qF(cn)/(1−F(cn))≥wn for n large enough. (In particular, no upper bound
on pisnecessarybecausetheleft-handsideofequation11convergestozero
as n goes to inﬁnity.) As in part (i), we obtain equations 12 and 13. Now,
however, the right-hand side of both equations converge to zero as n grows
arbitrarily large. Thus, both kn+hn and kn−hn must diverge to inﬁnity.
Suppose c = 0, 0 < f(0) < ¥ and p > p as in part (iii) of the Lemma.
Assuming there is a solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2, we get that kn =
qF(cn)n1/2 and hn = wnn1/2 must satisfy the system 7 and 8. But from
Lemma 1(ii) we know that the system 7 and 8 has no solution if p > p.
Finally, suppose c = 0 and f(0) = 0 as in part (iv) of the Lemma. As-
suming there is a solution (cn,wn) to equations 1 and 2, we get that kn =
qF(cn)n1/2 and hn = wnn1/2 must satisfy equations 12 and 13. Thus, kn
must converge to zero as n grows arbitrarily large; otherwise the right-hand
side of both equations converge to inﬁnity while the left-hand side con-









If hn converges to some h along any subsequence of solutions (cn,wn) to
equations 1 and 2, then the left-hand side of the equation above converges
to exp(−4h2)/exp(−4h2) = 1. But p > p implies p > 1/2, so the right-
hand side of the equation above is strictly smaller than one. RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 20
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